



SCION: A Secure Internet Architecture

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
Anapaya Systems

Internet Weakness: DoS and DDoS Attacks

- Expensive and difficult to protect against DoS und DDoS attacks
- Despite large investments, attacks continue to be successful
 - **November 2015: Protonmail attacked during 1 week**
 - **March 2016: CH e-commerce under attack: Digitec, Galaxus, SBB, Migros, etc.** (Hackers demanded 25 Bitcoins to stop attacks)
 - **Fall 2016: Global Mirai botnet attacks, e.g., OVH, Dyn, russian banks**
 - June 2017: Northkorea “Hidden Cobra” botnet uncovered
 - September 2017: Global airport chaos, DDoS paralyzes checkin systems
- **Can we reliably defend against DDoS attacks?**

Internet Weakness: Communication Path Hijacking

- Sender und receiver have limited control over routing paths
- Attacks can hijack and relay paths
- **How can we guarantee communication paths?**



Internet Weakness: Kill Switch ruptures Sovereignty

- Current Internet suffers from several “Kill Switches”, which can halt communication within a geographical area
- Several attack avenues exist: DDoS, BGP hijacking, DNS redirection, BGPSEC / DNSSEC / TLS certificate revocation
- Example August 2017: An erroneous route injected by Google prevents communication for 50% of Internet in Japan during 40 minutes
- **Can we construct an Internet without Kill Switches?**


SCION Architecture Design Goals

- **High availability**, even for networks with malicious parties
 - Adversary: access to management plane of router
 - Communication should be available if adversary-free path exists
- **Secure entity authentication**
that scales to global heterogeneous (dis)trusted environment
- **Flexible trust**: enable selection of trust roots
- **Transparent operation**: clear what is happening to packets and whom needs to be relied upon for operation
- **Balanced control** among ISPs, senders, and receivers
- **Scalability, efficiency, flexibility**




Approach for Scalability: Isolation Domain (ISD)

- Isolation Domain (ISD): grouping of ASes
- ISD core: ASes that manage the ISD
- Core AS: AS that is part of ISD core
- Control plane is organized hierarchically
 - Inter-ISD control plane
 - Intra-ISD control plane




Intra-ISD Path Exploration: Beaconing

- Core ASes K, L, M initiate Path-segment Construction Beacons (PCBs), or “beacons”
- PCBs traverse ISD as a flood to reach downstream ASes
- Each AS receives multiple PCBs representing path segments to a core AS




Up-Path Segment Registration

- AS selects path segments to announce as **up-path segments** for local hosts
- Up-path segments are registered at local path servers




Down-Path Segment Registration

- AS selects path segments to announce as **down-path segments** for others to use to communicate with AS
- Down-path segments are uploaded to core path server in core AS




Path Creation: Local ISD

- Client requests path segments to $\langle \text{ISD}, \text{AS} \rangle$ from local path server
- If down-path segments are not locally cached, local path server send request to core path server
- Local path server replies
 - Up-path segments to local ISD core ASes
 - Down-path segments to $\langle \text{ISD}, \text{AS} \rangle$
 - Core-path segments as needed to connect up-path and down-path segments




Inter-ISD Path Exploration: Sample Core-Path Segments from AS T



Path Creation: Remote ISD


- Host contacts local path server requesting <ISD, AS>
- If path segments are not cached, local path server will contact core path server
- If core path server does not have path segments cached, it will contact remote core path server
- Finally, host receives up-, core-, and down-segments




No Global Coordination Required for Adoption

- SCION re-uses current local network infrastructure
- Requires setup of routers and servers (commodity HW)
 - SCION border router
 - Beacon, certificate, and path servers
- Border routers of different ASes connect natively or using as overlay over the Internet
- For fault tolerance, multiple servers and border routers can be set up
- Minimal deployment: single commodity host per domain, implementing border router and all servers


Deployment @ ETH




Use Case: IoT Protection through Default Off



Use Case: VPN-based Deployment




SCION-IP Gateway (SIG) Deployment




- Legacy device
- SCION border router
- SIG

SCIONLab



Global SCIONLab Network




SCION Visualization System

SCION AS Visualization




- [SCION Website](#)
- [SCION on Github](#)
- [SCION Visualizations on Github](#)

Source AS: Destination AS: Data:

SCIOND IP Address:




Swiss SCION Network




SCION AS runs on ODROID and Raspberry Pi

ODROID
Hardkernel



Raspberry Pi



Belief that Internet is Immutable

- Evidence appears overwhelming that Internet is immutable: IPv6, BGPSEC, DNSSEC, etc.
- However, benefits are limited, esp. for early deployers
- Our goal: provide many benefits, even for early adopters, such that one cannot turn back



Conclusions

- SCION is a secure Internet architecture that we can start using **today**
- Many use cases
 - Cost savings with replacement of leased lines
 - Business continuity: high-speed failover
 - Highly secure communication network
 - Strong defense against DDoS attacks, with communication guarantee
 - Path guarantee, attacker cannot re-route traffic
 - No external kill switches, regaining Internet Sovereignty

SCION Projekt Team

- Netsec: Daniele Asoni, Laurent Chuat, Sergiu Costea, Sam Hitz, Mike Farb, Tobias Klausmann, Jonghoon Kwon, Tae-Ho Lee, Sergio Monroy, Chris Pappas, Juan Pardo, **Adrian Perrig**, Benjamin Rotenberger, Stephen Shirley, Jean-Pierre Smith, Brian Trammell
- Infsec: **David Basin**, Tobias Klenze, Ralf Sasse, Christoph Sprenger, Thilo Weghorn
- Programming Methodology: Marco Eilers, **Peter Müller**



SCION Commercialization

- To commercialize SCION, we have founded Anapaya Systems in June 2017
 - 4 Founders: Prof. David Basin, Sam Hitz (CEO), Prof. Peter Müller, Prof. Adrian Perrig
- We already have several bank and ISP customers
- We are starting to seek investors
- Visit us at: www.anapaya.net



Additional Information

- <https://www.scion-architecture.net>
 - Book
 - Papers
 - Videos
 - Tutorials
 - Newsletter signup
- <https://www.anapaya.net>
 - Commercializing SCION equipment
- <https://github.com/scionproto/scion>
 - Source code